Editor’s Note: This article about coast defense during the Civil War first appeared in the Journal of the United States Artillery Vol. 39, No. 1, January-February 1913. The editors noted that while not strictly an account of an operation in coast defense they included it in their series as an account of operations of guns afloat against guns ashore.
The Confederates in January 1862 held a line from Bowling Green to Columbus, Kentucky, which was to bar approach from the north to the south, as well as to serve as a base for invasion of the north. The Union forces determined to begin operations by breaking this line, preferably in the center, and to make a "strategic penetration" of the Confederate lines.
On Jan. 29, 1862, General U. S. Grant, inviting attention to the large force being concentrated in the district by the Confederates, and urging the feasibility of his plan, asked for authority to attack and hold Fort Henry, near the Kentucky-Tennessee line.
He said that, if this were not soon done, the defenses on both the Tennessee and the Mississippi Rivers would be materially strengthened. From Fort Henry, it would be easy to operate either on the Cumberland, only 12 miles distant, on Memphis, or on Columbus. Besides, advancing them toward the Confederate States would have a great moral effect on the Union troops.
This plan was agreed to by the department commander, General Halleck, on Jan. 30, 1862, it being directed that the troops be taken up the Tennessee, convoyed by Commander Foote and his gunboats.
Fort Henry was a closed earthwork, with bastion front, located on the right bank of the Tennessee River, comprising about 10 acres. Fort Heiman, a small work, was across the river.
Fort Henry was built during January 1862 and contained 17 guns mounted on platforms, of which the following 12 bore on the river: (Editor's Note: The official report of an officer of engineers states that 12 guns bore upon the river, but the reports of the line officers state 11. One of the eight 32 pdrs. appears to be the gun that is differently reported.)
One 10-inch columbiad; one rifled gun, same caliber as 24-pdr. gun, but firing 62 lbs. projectile; two 42-pdrs.; eight 32-pdrs. all arranged to fire through embrasures formed by erecting between guns a parapet of sandbags carefully laid.
There were extensive lines of infantry cover in rear, holding commanding ground that would have been dangerous to the fort, if possessed by the enemy.
The lines and main work, being on the right bank of the river, and arranged with good defensive relations, rendered the position capable of offering a strong resistance against a land attack from the east.
All guns functioned well, except, the columbiad, the recoil of which was excessive.
The ammunition on hand on Jan. 18 was as follows:
10-inch columbiad, 100 rounds; 32-pdr., 782; 12-pdr., 274; 24-pdr., 100. Total, 1156 rounds.
The artillery garrison consisted of one company of about 75 men.
There was great difficulty in getting competent artillerymen and there was not a sufficient number of artillery officers. There was no ammunition suitable for the 42-pdrs.
Fort Heiman was not in action.
Torpedoes were sunk in the chute of the river, at the foot of the island, but, due to lack of time and powder, none were placed in the main channel. All were rendered useless by a heavy rise of water.
The Navy had the following vessels in the action, organized in two divisions:
First Division: Gunboats Cincinnati and Carondolet: six 32-pdrs., three 8-inch guns, four 42-pdr. rifles, one 12-pdr. howitzer. Gunboat Essex: one 32-pdr., three 11-inch guns, one 10-inch gun, one 12-pdr. howitzer. Gunboat St. Louis: seven 32-pdrs., two 8-inch guns, four 42-pdr. rifles, one rifled howitzer.
Second Division (old boats): Conestoga: four 32-pdrs.; Lexington, four 8-inch guns, two 32-pdrs. Tyler: six 8-inch guns, one 32-pdr.
The Federal forces available for the land attack are estimated to have been about 16,000 men; and the guns of the river fleet were 65. The Confederate force was about 2610 men and 11 guns, i.e. guns of Fort Henry in action. (Editor's Note: The reports of the line officers indicate that only 9 guns were in action. The difference in the reports appears to have been due to the two 42-pdrs.’ lacking proper ammunition, some of the reports not including them as in action for that reason, though they do appear to have been fired.)
The attack against Fort Henry was made at 12:30 p.m. on Feb. 6, 1862, with four ironclad gunboats, the Cincinnati, the Carondolet, the St. Louis, and the flagship Essex in the first division, and three old gunboats, the Conestoga, the Tyler and the Lexington in the second division.
The latter took a position astern and inshore of the armored boats, doing good execution there, while the armored boats were placed in the first order of steaming, and approached the fort in a parallel line.
Fire was opened from the flagship at 1700 yards range, the other gunboats following and the fort responding. When the boats, steaming slowly, had approached within 600 yards of the fort, their fire, as well as the fire of the fort, increased in rapidity and accuracy.
Twenty minutes before the close of the action, the Essex received a shot in her boilers, which resulted in wounding by scalding some 29 officers and men, and caused her to drop out of line, entirely disabled.
Firing from the fort was kept up for a time upon the three gunboats that continued to approach, the fort's flag being finally hauled down after an action lasting one hour and 15 minutes.
The United States flag was then hoisted over the works and the Confederate commander came on board the flagship and surrendered some 60 or 70 men, a hospital boat with 60 invalids, and the fort and its effects, mounting about 20 guns and having barracks and tents capable of accommodating approximately 6000 men.
Taking up in detail the operations in the fort during this attack, the official report mentions among other things:
A short time after the engagement began, a rifled cannon burst, killing three men and disabling some others. This impaired very much the morale of the troops serving the guns, both because of the "gun-shyness" created and because of the doubt entertained as to the ability of the remaining guns, all unrifled, to do effective work.
From the rear of the line of four armored gunboats, a wooden gunboat was using curved fire, striking the parapet, but in no case penetrating to the interior of the fort, unless the cheek of an embrasure was struck.
One of the 32-pdrs. was struck by a shell passing through an embrasure, all of the gunners at the piece being disabled and the gun rendered unfit for service.
At about the same time, a premature discharge occurred at one of the 42-pdrs., causing the death of three men and seriously injuring others.
Next, the 10-inch columbiad was out of service, the priming-wire having jammed and broken in the vent, virtually spiking the piece.
By this time the gunboats had approached to within 600 or 700 yards of the works.
The men now becoming discouraged, as they saw the boats approaching nearer and nearer, they even stopped working the 32-pdrs., believing their shot were too light to produce any effect on the ironclad boats.
After firing had continued for about an hour and five minutes, only two guns in the fort responded to the fire of the gunboats, whose shots were telling with effect on the parapet.
Effort was made to get men from outside the work to man the guns, but it could not be done.
General Tilghman, the Confederate commander, then sent instructions to the commanders of the troops in the exterior lines to withdraw with their forces, which was done, the retreat being along the road to Fort Donelson. Of the approximately 2600 men the Confederates had in the vicinity of Fort Henry, fewer than 100 were surrendered, the larger force getting away while the small garrison in the fort fought, as it were, a delaying action covering the retreat.
On surrendering, General Tilghman stated that all his guns except four were out of action, he having commenced the action with 11 against the fleet.
The Confederate garrison, on the 6th of February, consisted of actually 2610 men, only one third of whom were either well armed or disciplined, while the fort could be enfiladed from three points on the west bank. Under such conditions news arrived that General Grant with 12,000 men was moving up the east bank, and General Smith with 6000 up the west bank.
The position not being deemed tenable or as important as Fort Donelson, and the garrison being urgently needed to reinforce Fort Donelson, at 10:15 a.m. the infantry, the field artillery, and the cavalry, fell back on Donelson, a company of heavy artillery manning the fort to cover the retreat of the main body.
So when the fleet commenced the attack, the fort was overmatched both as to troops and as to the number and caliber of guns. The main object of the garrison of the fort was to gain time for the retreating main body, and with that object the fight was maintained for more than an hour.
Though the surrender was made to Flag-Officer Foote, by his direction the fort was turned over to General Grant, who arrived on the scene about one hour later.
The plan of the attack had been for the army to attack the rear of the fort simultaneously with the naval attack from the river; but the land attack was prevented by the excessively muddy roads and by the high state of the water, which prevented the arrival of the troops until some time after the surrender.
Then the fort had surrendered, the fleet withdrew, returning to St. Louis.
Casualties: Cincinnati: Killed 1, wounded 9; Essex: Killed 1, scalded 38 (of whom 13 died later);
Fort Henry: Killed by enemy 2, seriously wounded (1 dying) 3, slightly wounded 2, killed by premature explosion 2, seriously wounded by premature explosion 2, slightly wounded by premature explosion 1, temporarily disabled by explosion of gun 1, missing 5, total 21.
There were surrendered: officers 12, men 66, men in hospital 16, guns, munitions of war, etc.
The Essex was hit 15 times, Cincinnati (flagship) 31 times, St. Louis 7 times, Carondolet 6 times.
Carondolet fired 107 shells, Essex fired 70 shots, St. Louis fired 107 shots, Lexington fired 37 shells and the Conestoga fired 75 32-pdr. shell, 14 12-pdr. shell and 2 12-pdr. shot.
The armored casemates effectually resisted the shot of the enemy, and their formation, bow on, presented an unfavorable target to the land gunners.
In summary:
Lack of personnel to work the [Fort Henry] guns properly caused the men to be worked to the point of exhaustion.
Reinforcing artillerymen during progress of action, found impossible.
Effect on the morale of artillerymen, of seeing their fire unable to stop the enemy’s approach.
Part of armament (the 42-pdrs.) with no ammunition.
Failure of the joint operations on part of the Federal forces, making it possible for the greater part of the Confederates to escape.
Preponderance of fire of gunboats over that of fort.
Guns of gunboats were served were served more quickly, of greater caliber and better ballistic properties.
Protection furnished gunners on the boats, far superior to that furnished the personnel of the fort.
Damage to material in fort put several guns out of service.
One of the earliest recorded occasions on which submarine mines were used in aid of land defense.
An example of an artillery duel at extreme short ranges.
Attack formation of gunboats adopted, afforded minimum of target to Confederate fire, but also minimum number of guns bearing on works.
Change in naval tactics in attacking works, as compared with those previously seen.
Use of curved fire by supported gunboats firing over leading line of boats.
Determination on part of the navy to close in to shortest ranges, as seen in action of gunboats, no long range bombardment being employed.
Fire from gunboats wild till within 1200 yards of range.
Fire of the forts withheld till boats were within 1600 yards range.
Confederate fire rather more effective as to hits than usually the case, obtaining high proportion of hits, for ammunition expended.
Example of delaying action, covering a retreat.