Editor’s Note: This report on Mississippi Rive operations in 1862 was published as part of a series on Civil War coast defense in the Journal of the United States Artillery, Vol. 41, No. 1, January-February 1914. While not strictly “coast,” this is an account of “guns afloat against guns ashore.” The article was written by 1st Lt. Walter J. Buttgenbach of the Coast Artillery Corps.
New Orleans, the metropolis of the South, had in 1860 a population of 170,000, and had shipped in 1860-61 sugar to the value of $25,000,000 and cotton to the value of $92,000,000, which gave it rank as the chief commercial port of the South. It was also a strategic point of great importance. Its position controlled the commerce of the South, which then passed down the Mississippi River.
The many mouths of that river, and the frequency of violent Gulf storms, made it difficult to maintain a blockade for the purpose of breaking down the extensive commerce between the river and the ocean. With New Orleans in the hands of the Federal troops, the Confederacy would be cut in two and would experience great difficulty in keeping up its supplies from over sea.
A Federal force under General Grant was working down the river and in April 1862 was at New Madrid and Island No. 10, pushing on to Memphis, which surrendered the following June, leaving Vicksburg still to be taken.
In the beginning of 1862, an effective blockade being maintained on the Gulf, the Federal administration turned its attention to the capture of New Orleans.
This subject had been brought to the attention of General McClellan as well as of the Secretary of the Navy, and it was decided to make up a joint Army and Navy expedition, the forces of the Army being under Gen. B.F. Butler and those of the Navy under Captain Farragut.
It was contemplated to make a purely naval attack and then, after the forts were taken, to have the Army hold the city. The plan adopted was one laid before the President by Mr. G.V. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and was based on a memorandum drawn up by General Barnard, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac.
The defenses protecting New Orleans may, in general terms, be said to have consisted of an exterior line of forts and earthworks intended to prevent the entrance of armed hostile vessels into the river, and an interior line of works, about eight miles long, in the immediate vicinity of the city, and constructed almost entirely with a view to repelling an attack made on land by an infantry force. Where this second line crossed the river below the city it was to be strengthened by batteries.
General Lovell, the Confederate commander, made an effort to obtain some heavy guns, especially 10-inch columbiads and sea coast mortars, from Richmond and Pensacola; but none could be spared. The general opinion seemed to be that the city would not be attacked from the river side; so General Lovell had to content himself with making the best defense possible with the guns, etc., he had on hand.
Subsequently, however, upon the evacuation of Pensacola some additional, guns, including 8- and 10-inch columbiads, 10-inch seacoast mortars, and rifled 42-pdrs., were obtained.
The principal works with which we are concerned are those which were at Forts Jackson and Saint Philip, together with the adjacent water batteries, as it was upon them that the main brunt of the attack fell.
Forts Jackson and Saint Philip were situated at Planchmine Bend, on opposite sides of the river, 25 miles above the head of the passes and some 75 miles below New Orleans. Fort Saint Philip was on the left bank and Fort Jackson on the right bank, a little below Fort Saint Philip.
At the time of the passage of the forts, the woods on the right bank had been cleared away below Fort Jackson almost to the extreme range of the guns, thus affording no shelter from observation. The left bank was treeless. The country is generally flat, and at time of high water this surface of the river is above that of the surrounding country, the river being kept in its channel only by an extensive system of levees.
Fort Jackson was a bastioned pentagon, casemated and built of brick. Its fronts were about 110 yards long and in good condition. The scarp walls were 22 feet high, measured from the offset of the foundation, which was nearly at the bottom of the wet ditch. This ditch was about six feet deep, leaving the top of the scarp about 16 feet above the surface of the water in the ditch. The ditches were flanked by one 24-pdr. howitzer in casemate in each of the flanks.
There was no counterscarp wall. The ditch was revetted with timber running up to the edge of the water, from where the earth sloped more than 45 degrees. The parapets were not carried around the flanks and faces of the bastions for fear their weight could not be borne; so there was not much room for musketry fire on the flanks, it being possible to station on each flank only a few riflemen behind the top of the scarp.
The faces of the bastions could be lined with infantry, as they were hollowed out, leaving the top of the scarp to serve as a parapet.
The two curtains bearing on the river were casemated for eight guns each, the guns, due to their mounting, having but a limited sector of fire. The parapets of the two water fronts were arranged to receive 22 channel bearings guns. The parapets of the other fronts were arranged for 16 more barbette guns, a portion of which bore directly upon the channel.
The three land fronts of the work were covered by a glacis-coupé, with a covered way. The two terminating branches of this covered way bore upon the channel and were arranged for eight or nine guns in each. The branches of the covered way of the west front bore well upon the channel above the fort and were arranged to receive 31 guns.
The entire work was thus arranged for the following armament:
Casemate guns 16; barbette guns on two channel-bearing faces of main work 22; barbette guns on two extremities of glacis-coupé, having same bearing on two faces 17; barbette guns in covered way of west front (looking up the channel) 31; barbette guns on other fronts 16; exterior battery communicating with covered way of east front arranged for guns (not mounted) 25; total heavy guns 127; (Ten flanking howitzers not included.)
At the time the Confederates obtained possession of the work in 1861, there were in it:
Sixteen 32-pdr. guns, 26 24-pdr. guns, 10 24-pdr. flanking howitzers, 14 24-pdr. casemate carriages, 9 24-pdr. flank defense howitzer carriages, 12 24-pdr. barbette carriages. Most of the carriages were not in good order.
Strenuous efforts were made to put the work in order, and its armament at the time of the attack of the Federal fleet was essentially made up of the following:
Casemate: 14 24-pdr. smooth bore guns, 10 24-pdr. flanking howitzers. Barbette: two 10-inch columbiads, three 8-inch columbiads, one 7-inch rifle, six 42-pdrs., 15 32-pdrs., 11 24-pdrs., one 7-3/8-inch howitzer, two 8-inch mortars. Parade: one 6-pdr., one 12-pdr. howitzer. In all, 68 guns.
The glacis-coupé was surrounded by a wide wet ditch having a little over three feet of water in it.
In the center of the fort was a defensive barrack (citadel) of decagonal shape. It was intended to be made a bombproof by covering the 1-foot square timbers on the ceiling with earth. It could accommodate 400 to 500 men. There was also considerable more bombproof cover in the casemates and galleries; so the garrison could be well sheltered from bombardment.
With reference to position, the salient of the north bastion was about 140 yards distant from the river and some 110 yards from the levee; and the river itself is about 700 yards wide.
Just outside of and below the main work, covering the approach to it, was a water-battery consisting of: one 10-inch columbiad, one 10-inch seacoast mortar, two 8-inch columbiads, two 32-pdrs. rifled, (throwing projectiles of 60 to 80 lbs.).
This battery had its crest 14 feet above low water; the covered way batteries, 16 feet above low water; and the main work, 24 feet above low water.
Of the guns in Fort Jackson, the flanking howitzers and some half a dozen of the 24-pdrs. and 32-pdrs. could, from their position, have had little or no share in the engagement with the fleet.
Fort Saint Philip was originally built by the Spaniards, and later completed by the Americans. It is very irregular in shape and occupies a quadrilateral space of about 150 yards by 100 yards.
The front towards the river (first built) had a bastioned trace, and the other portions were added later to enclose the work and give it some semblance of flanking arrangements. The walls, of brick originally, had been strengthened, additional thicknesses of masonry being added and earthen parapets provided all around the work. The wet ditch was deepened so as to have at least six feet of water at the lowest stage of the river.
As a general thing, the scarp wall on the land fronts was 16 to 17 feet high, measured from the bottom of the ditch, and on the water fronts 14 to 15 feet high. The part of the ditch, however, near the scarp wall was not more than two or three feet at low water, the deepest part of the ditch being generally nearer the counterscarp. This counterscarp was not of brick, but was simply a flank revetment similar to that of Fort Jackson.
There was a postern and drawbridge on the western face and another near the most northern angle of the works.
Two external batteries (earthen) had been built in connection with the fort, having the usual arrangement of wet ditches, parapets, etc., and were intended to mount 22 guns on the water faces, and six 24-pdrs. on the extremities and rear.
The main work of the fort was arranged to receive some 20 heavy guns bearing directly on the channel, besides some 12 or more bearing on land; the guns were to be in barbette and very low, the crest of the parapets being but 14 feet above the water and nine feet above ordinary high water.
Its armament at the time of the Federal attack consisted of the following: 4 8-inch columbiads in barbette, one 24-pdr. In barbette. Two water batteries were built outside of the work: Up-stream battery, 16 24-pdrs. Down-stream battery, one 8-inch columbiad, one 7-inch rifle, six 42-pdrs., nine 32-pdrs., four 24-pdrs. In all, 42 guns commanded the river below the bend.
In addition, there were: in the fort, one 8-inch mortar, one 10-inch mortar, one 13-inch mortar. On the parade, one 6-pdr., one 12-pdr., one 24-pdr. field howitzer. Below and to the northeast of the lower water-battery, four 10-inch sea coast mortars.
These last pieces had no appreciable effect upon the contest; their action is hardly mentioned in the reports of the fleet.
Fort Saint Philip is about 700 yards higher up the river than Fort Jackson and the distance between the nearest salients of the main works is about 1000 yards.
Thus we find that, from a point in the river a mile and a half from the lowest battery of Fort Jackson to another point a mile and a half above the nearest up-stream bearing battery, we have a distance of some three miles to traverse, two miles of which are under the fire of over 100 guns, and the rest under that of 50 to 100.
With vessels then in use, taking into account the current of the river, three and a half miles per hour, it would take approximately 25 minutes or half an hour to pass over the distance, which will give one a fair idea of the difficulties involved in attempting to pass the works.
However, it must be borne in mind that many of the guns in the works were only 24-pdrs., while the garrisons holding them were made up of volunteer troops, militia, etc. The total number of troops was some 10 companies, 1100 men approximately, counting those both in the forts and in the outside works. The number in each of the forts themselves was probably 200 or 300. Additional troops were stationed up the river along the second line of defense.
As indicating the character of some of the troops it is mentioned in a Confederate report that one of the companies assigned to a water-battery was raw, undrilled, perfectly ignorant of the use of even the shotguns with which it was armed, and had never been drilled as artillery. Furthermore, many of the garrison were foreigners who, it was said, had volunteered for garrison duty to avoid being impressed into the Confederate field armies, their sympathies being Northern
The supply of powder in the forts seems to have been ample. In January 1862, there was on hand 55,000 pounds, and more was procured later, the exact amount not being known.
In concluding this statement of the Confederate land forces there should be mentioned, as affecting their availability, the fact that there was excessively high water at the time. The parade and the floors of the casemates at Fort Jackson were from three to 18 inches under water, and Fort Saint Philip was in a similar condition, though the water there was not quite so deep. The clothing and the feet of the men in the garrison were always wet, the men being thereby exposed to much discomfort and sickness.
Besides the land defenses, there were vessels of various types pertaining to the several organizations, State and Confederate.
Of the Confederate Navy there were present:
Louisiana: two 7-inch, three 9-inch S.B., four 8-inch S.B, seven 32-pdrs., rifled. [A footnotes adds that “Though an ironclad and mounting 16 guns, yet this vessel lacked motive power and required tugs to move it about. It was practically a floating battery and in a very incomplete state. The arc fire of its guns was only 40 degrees; and, due to the smallness of the ports, the maximum elevations of the guns were from 4 degrees to 6 degrees, corresponding to a range of about 2000 yards.”]
Steamer McRae: six 32-pdrs., S.B., one 9-pdr., amidship
Steamer Jackson: two 32-pdrs., S.B.
Ram Manassas: one 32-pdr. in bow (carronade)
Two launches: one howitzer each
Of Louisiana State gunboats there were present: Governor Moore, two 32-pdrs. rifled guns; General Quitman, two 32-pdrs. S.B. guns, several unarmored vessels.
Of River Defense Gunboats (converted towboats, etc.) there were present: Warrior, Stonewall Jackson, Resolute, Defiance, General Lowell, R.J. Breckinridge. These vessels mounted from one to two pivot guns, 32 pdr., each. They were not under the control of the Navy at all, but were to cooperate with it. More will be said of these later.
The Confederate fleet mounted in all 40 guns, of which 25 were 32-pdrs. and one fourth were rifled.
In addition to the armament, there was also a boom or obstruction placed across the river, as it was thought that the guns mounted in the forts could not hinder steamers from passing, unless they could be detained for some time under the fire of the guns. A raft was built to obstruct the river, leaving in it, however, an opening large enough to let one vessel pass through at a time.
The first raft built was carried away by high water, and then another was built, which also was damaged by high water and storms in April. The raft consisted of a line of spars and large timbers chained together and anchored at various points by sunken schooners. It was located opposite Fort Jackson and was covered by some 74 or 80 guns of the forts.
It was felt that as long as this obstruction held, the city of New Orleans was safe. After having been partly destroyed it was not thoroughly rebuilt, and was found wanting when the time of the attack came, being in large part wrecked by parties sent out by Farragut just before he made his attack.
Torpedoes, or mines, as now called, were tried, but were not successful due to the great depth of the water (134 feet where the raft was put) and the powerful currents to be contended with.
As a measure of defense, fire rafts were made use of, not only for the purpose of sending them against the Federal wooden vessels to set them afire, but also as a means of lighting up the river to aid the Confederate gunners in their aiming.
There were certain small works, such as Fort Pike, Fort Macomb, the works at Tower Dupré, Lake Borgue, the Chalmette Batteries, and the McGhee works, which bore but little part in the combat and for that reason are not considered in this article.
Besides 19 mortar vessels (schooners), carrying each one 13-inch mortar firing shell weighing 285 lbs., the mortar fleet comprised the Harriet, Lane, Owasco, Clifton, John P. Jackson, Westfield, Miami and Portsmouth, seven vessels attached to the mortar fleet and used to shift the schooners into position or to protect them from attack that they could not resist with their peculiar ordnance.
The Owasco was of the same class as the gunboat Cayuga; the Clifton, Jackson, Westfield, Miami, and Harriet Lane were armed side-wheel double-ender ferry boats, practically used as tugs; and the Portsmouth was a sailing sloop.
Farragut’s vessels consisted of seven sloops of war, nine gunboats, and one other vessel.
The sloops of war were: The Hartford, a wooden steam sloop, 1000 tons, 225 feet long, 44 feet beam, carrying 22 9-inch guns, two 20-pdr. Parrott guns, one rifled gun on the forecastle, and howitzers in the fore and main tops; the Brooklyn, Richmond and Pensacola, similar to the Hartford; and the Oneida, Varuna and Iroquois of lower rating.
The gunboats were: The Cayuga, Itasca, Katahdin, Kennebec, Kineo, Pinola, Sciota, Winona, and Wissahickon.
The odd vessel was an old sidewheel steamer, the Mississippi.
Farragut’s fleet, i.e. those under his immediate command, consisted of 17 vessels, all regularly built for war, except the Varuna, which was a converted merchant steamer.
About 90 percent of the batteries of the eight larger vessels were divided, as was usual, between the two sides of the ship; and, though a few guns were mounted on pivots which allowed firing on either side yet the number of the crew being based on the expectation of fighting only one broadside, only half of the guns could be used at one time, even in the rare event of having an enemy on each side.
In estimating the number of available guns in a fleet of sea going steamers of that day, it may be roughly stated that 60 percent could be brought into action on one side. In the Mississippi squadron sometimes only one fourth could be used.
Nine of the gunboats carried one heavy and one light gun, both pivoted; none of the fleet could fire dead ahead.
The attacking vessels which passed the forts carried 192 guns, and adding those on the mortar flotilla, some 110 in all, there were 302 guns on the Federal side, while against them were 126 guns in the works ashore and 40 on the Confederate vessels.
Captain Farragut was appointed to command the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron January 9, 1862. On the 20th of February he arrived at Ship Island, Mississippi Sound, which was then the naval base as well as the military rendezvous.
The squadron, after much work and unavoidable delay, was finally assembled. Of the ships sent to take part in the expedition, the lighter vessels, including the mortar boats, were taken over the bar by the 18th of March. Three ships of greater draft gave much trouble, two of them being gotten over by the 8th of April, and the Colorado, the largest, not being brought into the river at all.
Gen. Benjamin F. Butler was assigned to command the troops, consisting of approximately 15,000 men — 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry and 580 artillery. The military expedition left Hampton Roads Feb. 25, 1862, arriving off Ship Island March 21, when it was joined by other troops that had preceded the main force. A force consisting of 6000 men (some eight regiments and three batteries) was made up and sent to the Mississippi. It arrived off the passes April 17th. The remainder of the troops were kept behind at Ship Island as a support.
The plans of operation were based on proposals of Gen. J.G. Barnard, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac, approved by General McClellan, and referred to Captain Farragut by the Navy Department.
It was contemplated by the Navy that the mortar fleet should compel the Confederates to surrender by bombarding the forts; but after a bombardment of six or seven days it was evident that other measures were necessary; for ammunition was getting low, the men were worn out, and the vessels badly shaken up. The Navy plan, or what is known as the Porter plan (though it is disputed that Admiral Porter should have credit for initiating it) was in the main the one followed.
The mortar vessels during the bombardment were to fire a shell every 10 minutes, and Fort Jackson, a casemate work, was to receive the largest share of the bombardment, only some three or four vessels being employed against Fort Saint Philip.
Two plans were contemplated: according to the first, the vessels were to run by the batteries at night, or in a fog; while according to the other they were to attack the forts by laying the big ships alongside, avoiding the casemates and firing shell, grape, and canister into the barbette positions, at the same time clearing the ramparts with the ships’ guns in the tops, while the smaller and more easily handled vessels were to throw shrapnel at short range and assist in clearing the parapets and dismounting the guns in barbette.
The large ships were to anchor with 45 fathoms of chain with slip ropes, and the smaller vessels were to keep underway, some getting above the forts and opening a cross fire. The mortars, at the same time, were to keep up a rapid and continuous fire, moving up to shorter range.
The objections to a run-by were that it was not likely that an intelligent enemy would have failed to place obstructions across a channel protected by batteries, and that, should a run-by have been successfully made the enemy would still have been left in rear, so that the mortar vessels would have been left to contend against the forts and hostile ships still in existence.
In such a case it would have been necessary, in order to bring past all vessels, to reengage the forts from above, as the forts would have to be taken before a free channel could be obtained. On the other hand, if the forts were taken, the moral effect would probably be great enough to open the way clear to New Orleans. Once having possession of the forts the fate of the city above would be settled.
It was thought the Confederates might hold their ground at English Turn and there make a last effort to hold out. So, if that place were found impassable by water, since there was solid ground there it was contemplated to bring up Federal troops, landing them below the forts and attacking the latter in rear, while the ships attacked in front. If the ships got by the forts and there were no obstructions, the ships were to push on to New Orleans and the surrender of the city was to be demanded.
It was stated that Fort Saint Philip, could be taken by a combined army and navy attack, 2000 men being supported by the ships. The ditch could be filled with fascines and the wall easily sealed with ladders.
In accordance with this plan operations were commenced.
The first Federal reconnaissance was made April 9th, when one of the Confederate reconnoitering steamers was pursued and followed by two of the Federal gunboats, which went up the river as far as the point of woods below Fort Jackson, where they were forced to retire by a few shots fired at them from the batteries.
On April 13th several Federal vessels went above, the point of woods on a reconnaissance and exchanged a few shots with the forts and then fell back. They were fired upon also by sharpshooters on the shore, but without much effect. On the next day the ships did not engage the forts, but continued shelling the woods and drove out the sharpshooters.
Men from the ships interrupted telegraphic communication below the fort, removing wires and cutting down poles. In consequence, the Confederate troops were withdrawn from below the forts, the telegraph lines being abandoned, owing to difficulties involved in reconstruction.
On April 15th the Federal commander brought up the rest of the fleet, extending from the head of the passes to the point of woods below the forts.
During this time, orders were repeatedly given to the commander of the Confederate river fleet to send fire barges down at night upon the Federal fleet, but in every case failure resulted: the barges were generally cut adrift too soon and drifted against the banks directly under the forts, firing Confederate wharves, lighting them up, while obscuring the position of the Federal vessels.
On April 16th the Federal gunboats continued their reconnaissance around the point of woods but were forced to retire by the fire of the forts. Meanwhile the Federals were engaged locating positions for the mortar fleet, Commander Porter having the river triangulated and surveyed. Two members of the Coast Survey were in charge; and in three days they covered some seven miles, including the forts, locating points for the mortar boats from which the exact ranges were known to the forts. These operations were conducted under fire and at an approximate distance of 2600 yards from the works
.
On the afternoon of the same day (4:15 p.m., April 16th) the Federals ran out a gunboat and fired upon the fort, and under cover of the gunboat two of the mortar boats were brought out into the stream. From the mortar boats fire was opened upon Fort Jackson at 5 p.m., and was kept up for an hour and a half. The Federal vessels finally retired behind the point of woods.
On April 17th several fire barges were sent down into the Federal fleet, but they also were unsuccessful.
The mortar boats were finally gotten into the desired positions by April 18th.
Farragut did not have much, faith in mortars. It is said his distrust of them arose from his knowledge that in 1815 a British fleet had unavailingly thrown 1000 shells into a fort at the very turn of the river where the attack by him was then being made. Commander Porter in his report says that prophecies were freely made that the bottoms of the schooners would drop out at the tenth fire.” However, the mortar boats being a part of the expedition, Farragut went ahead and Porter was given a free hand to make use of them.
The masts of the mortar boats were dressed off with bushes, so as to hide them better, and this was afterwards found to have been very successful, for never once during the bombardment were any of the vessels seen from the fort, although their approximate position was known. The mortar vessels were under the lee of a thick wood interwoven with vines. From the mast heads the forts could be plainly seen, while observers at the forts could not see the ships.
The mortar fleet was arranged in three divisions, the head vessel of the 1st Division being placed at a point 2850 yards from Fort Jackson and 3600 yards from Fort Saint Philip. The vessels were close to one another, and each had a position specially indicated for it.
The 1st Division consisted of the following: Norfolk Packet, Oliver H. Lee, Para, C.P. Williams, Arletta, William Bacon, Sophronia.
Next to the 1st Division was the 3rd Division, consisting of: John Griffith, Horace Beals (no mortar; not included as one of the 19), Sarah Bruen, Racer, Henry Janes, Dan Smith, Sea Foam (brig). All these vessels were anchored.
The six vessels of the 2nd Division were on the northeast shore of the river, the foremost one 3680 yards from Fort Jackson, to which this division was directed to turn its attention.
The 2nd Division was composed of the following: T.A. Ward, Maria J. Carlton, Matthew Vassar, George Mangham, Orvetta, Sidney C. Jones.
When the divisions were all placed in position, signal was made to commence action and they opened in order, each one firing every 10 minutes. This action began at 9 a.m., and as soon as the mortars opened fire, the forts responded with all the guns they could bring to bear. For some time the forts did not get the correct range: the hulls of the vessels on the northeast shore being covered with reeds and willows deceived them, and their shot and shell went over.
In the Confederate reports it is mentioned that 14 of the mortar vessels were concealed behind the point of woods and that the other six were hauled out into the stream, just at the extreme range of the forts’ heaviest guns. The Confederate fire was rapid, and as the shot and shell began to grow rather hot, Commander Porter asked that some of the gunboats be put in action to draw some of the forts’ fire.
For an hour and 50 minutes the head vessel of the mortar fleet bore the fire of the forts uninjured, and then withdrew to replenish ammunition. Gunboats were sent up by Farragut and reinforced the mortar vessels. By midday the fire on the vessels on the northeast shore (2nd Division) became so rapid and shot fell so close that the vessels were moved downstream and under cover.
The T.A. Ward was struck, as also was the George Mangham. Both were moved down some 200 yards, which maneuver is said to have thrown the Confederates out of range and not to have been discovered for some two or four hours. The Confederates state their fire was generally short for lack of elevation and in consequence of the inferiority of Confederate powder. Even the gun nearest the mortar vessels, the 10-inch sea coast mortar, would not reach the Federal vessels with the heaviest charges.
At 5 p.m. Fort Jackson was in flames — the citadel was burned, destroying clothing, commissary stores, etc. Many of the men and officers lost their bedding and clothing, which greatly added to the discomforts of the fort, already under water.
A little after sunset (7 p.m.) the firing on the mortar boats was ordered stopped, though, as later found out, it should have been kept up. But, due to the uncertainty of night firing and to the men’s having had nothing to eat or drink since daylight, it appeared advisable to stop it.
The 1st and 3rd Divisions were in action that day and the expenditure of ammunition was over 1400 shells (the Confederate report says the Federals fired 2997 shells). It was observed that many of the shells were lost in the air due to poor fuses. On the south shore, pointing of the mortars could be done only by means of sights fixed on the mast heads or other expedients.
Against the fort the mortar fire was accurate and terrible, shells falling everywhere within it and disabling guns. When the bombardment commenced, officers and men were directed to retire to the casemates of the fort; and this being done, nothing remained but to receive the furious storm of shells poured in.
An attempt was made to send fire barges down the river, but they were let go above the raft obstruction and they lodged under the forts. Furthermore, no guard boats were on duty below the raft, so the Federals were able to send two launches to continue their reconnaissance up to the very raft itself.
It was afterwards found out that this day’s firing was more accurate than any later.
The 13-inch mortar at Fort Saint Philip this day became useless after the 13th round, the bed breaking in two and the mortar falling upon the ground.
On the morning of the 19th the mortar fleet again opened fire at six o’clock and kept it up during the day. Gunboats came up river to engage the forts, but were driven back. At 9 a.m. the Maria J. Carlton was sunk by a shot passing through the deck, and two men were wounded. The fire from the forts was rather severe on the masts and the rigging of the 1st Division.
The fire of the mortar boats was excellent, as a large proportion of the shells fell inside Fort Jackson cutting up the terreplain, parapets, platforms, etc., as well as damaging casemates and threatening magazines. Some of the shells are said to have gone over, others short; though in general terms it may be said that the batteries were silenced every time the shells were concentrated on any one point.
The fuses of the mortars gave considerable trouble, and any attempt to time them had to be given up, full length being used so as to have the shells burst after they struck the ground. That was a disadvantage, as some shells buried themselves in the soft earth 18 or 20 feet on striking, and did not do much harm except by demoralizing the men.
Of the guns in the fort there were disabled, one 10-inch and one 8-inch columbiad, one 32-pdr. and one 24-pdr. as well as one 10-inch siege mortar. Two rifled 32-pdrs. in the water-battery were disabled. The bombardment continued regularly and was kept up all night. Failures were made in sending down fire barges.
On April 20th the bombardment was kept up, although the supply of ammunition began to grow short and steamers had to be sent down to bring up a fresh supply to the mortar fleet. Some occasional shots were fired from the gunboats. The wind was high and it was raining in the forenoon. No fire barges were sent down the river, and, as a result, that night between 11 and 12 o’clock under cover of the heaviest shell fire so far, two of the Federal gunboats went up in the darkness and attempted to cut through the chains of the raft and drag off the schooners.
A heavy fire was directed upon the vessels which caused them to fall back, but not until they had in part, at least, accomplished their mission, for the raft after this could no longer be regarded as an obstruction.
The next day firing was kept up, and several guns in the forts were disabled; some of them, however, were later repaired. Fort Jackson at this time was in need of extensive repairs everywhere. The Louisiana, an iron clad steamer, came down from above the forts and it was expected to make repairs under cover of her heavy guns.
The fire from the forts upon the head of the 1st Division of the mortar fleet was very rapid and troublesome. Some 125 shots fell close to the vessels in an hour and 30 minutes, without, however, doing any damage beyond hitting the Para, the foremost vessel, cutting up her rigging and spars. The Norfolk Packet also had her rigging and cross trees cut away by the fire, and her deck pierced.
The divisions, on account of the hard and arduous duty, were divided into three reliefs of four hours each, one division firing about 168 times a watch, or, altogether during 24 hours, some 1500 shells.
The fire of the mortars at this time was so intense that it was reported that windows were broken at Balize, 30 miles away, and men and officers were so worn out that on one vessel they would be lying fast asleep on deck while a mortar on the vessel next to them was still firing.
On April 22nd the Confederate military authorities tried hard to induce the naval commander to move the Louisiana, a vessel carrying 16 guns of heaviest caliber, below the raft obstruction, so as to bring this ship’s fire to bear upon the mortar fleet; but this was not done, as the naval officers did not consider the ship in proper condition to meet the Federal vessels, due to its incomplete condition, the vessel being regarded simply as a floating battery.
Fort Jackson was still being subjected to the heaviest fire from the 13-inch mortar shells, for, although Fort Saint Philip fired upon the Federal vessels, the main attention of the Federals was given to Fort Jackson. The bombardment was kept up day and night. The Confederate fire was mostly used in shelling the point of woods from both forts, and apparently with good results, as the mortar fire slackened towards evening. The casemates of the forts were much cut up by the Federal fire. Little or no success again attended the sending down of fire barges.
After a bombardment now lasting several days Commander Porter began to despair of taking the forts and to lose confidence in the mortars; but, a deserter coming in from the forts and reporting the havoc and demoralization so far created in them, the fire was kept up and never flagged to the end.
During these three days of fire the only damage done to the armament of the forts was caused by a shell striking a platform of a 24-pdr. in a salient near the main magazine; but not even that 24-pdr. was rendered useless.
The next day, April 23rd, was warm, clear and cloudless. The Confederates saw that no relief could be expected from their fleet, so the entire force was turned out to repair damages, the work going on under heavy fire from the Federal vessels. The bombardment continued without intermission till noon, then slackened, and the Confederates saw every indication of exhaustion on the part of the mortar flotilla and expected that the tactics of the Federals would necessarily be changed into an attack by broadsides from the larger ships. It was again suggested that the Louisiana be sent further down, but her commanding officer again objected.
Fort Saint Philip did not fire at all this day.
On the 23rd also Commander Porter urged Flag-Officer Farragut to commence the attack with his ships at night, as he feared the mortars would not hold out.
So then Farragut, after seeing that six days’ incessant fire failed to reduce the forts, determined to attempt their passage with his whole fleet, excepting that part under command of Porter.
A meeting of all the captains was called, the matter was deliberated, and Flag-Officer Farragut issued the necessary orders.
It was originally contemplated to advance to the attack in two columns abreast, each engaging the fort on its own side and that only. On second thought, considering that in the darkness and smoke vessels in parallel columns would be likely to foul each other and that the fleet might be thrown into confusion, the plan was changed and it was directed that the starboard column advance first, its rear vessel to be followed by the leading vessel of the port column, thus bringing the whole fleet into single line ahead. Besides, the leading division in going up the river was ordered not to use their port guns and the flag-officer’s division not to use their starboard guns in ascending the river, for fear of firing into each other.
It was also decided that, in case the forts were not reduced, and yet a portion of the fleet had gotten by them, that a land attack was to be made by General Butler landing on the Gulf side in rear of the forts and attempting to take Fort Saint Philip by storm and assault, the bombardment being kept up by the fleet.
In accordance with this plan, General Butler and his transports lay off Sable Island, landing some troops there, some 12 miles in rear of Fort Saint Philip, but yet the nearest point having sufficient depth of water for his transports.
Several vessels belonging to Commander Porter were sent up the bayou in rear of Fort Jackson in an attempt to cut off the garrisons of the forts.
On the 23rd orders were issued that the steamers belonging to the mortar fleet were to take position and enfilade the heavy water battery which commanded the approach to the forts. The vessels were to move up when the flag-officer weighed anchor and the fleet was under way.
No fire barges were sent down the river this night, and everything was in absolute darkness. The mortar vessels kept up a bombardment, which, as the time set for the run-by approached, grew more furious.
At 3.30 a. m., April 24th, the Federal vessels got under way, moving on the forts in accordance with orders previously issued.
Five vessels attached to the mortar fleet comprising the Harriet Lane (leading), the Westfield, the Owasco, the Clifton, and the Miami, moved up and took position under the batteries designated, the leading vessel 500 yards off and the others closing up as the fire commenced. These vessels kept their position and did not fall back till the last of the fleet, i.e., of Farragut’s ships, had gone by.
The Confederates saw the Federal vessels in motion and thought of preparing a strong demonstration against them with fire rafts; but suddenly seeing the fleet coming on making a rapid rush in column of twos in echelon, and realizing that the broken and scattered raft was no longer an obstacle and that the only resistance that could be offered was the fire of the forts, the Confederates made no demonstration.
The mortar fleet at this time was firing furiously and the river was illuminated by exploding shells...
The run-by was of short duration, occupying some 70 minutes, although it had been estimated that it was to be done in 45 minutes.
It was said that not half of the attacking vessels got a chance at the Confederate works. The river was too narrow for more than two or four vessels to act to advantage and, besides, there was danger of the ships firing into each other. The smoke was so dense that it was only now and then that one could see anything but the flash of cannon and fire rafts that were pushed down the river.
During the action a fire raft reached the Hartford which, in an effort to avoid it, was run ashore and set ablaze on the port side; the fire, however, was soon put out and the vessel again backed off, all the time keeping up its fire against the forts.
Finally the fire slackened and the smoke cleared off, when the Hartford found itself above the forts.
Admiral Farragut in his report says:
“As we approached the locality [of the two forts] I tried to concentrate the vessels but soon saw that we must take a raking fire for two miles, so we did not mince the matter but dashed directly ahead. They permitted us to approach within a mile and a quarter before they opened up on us.”
The Confederate vessels at the time of the run-by were in close order on the eastern bank of the river above the Louisiana, which was near Fort Saint Philip, and in the following order: Louisiana, Warrior, two river defense boats; McRae, Governor Moore, Manassas, three river defense gunboats. Tile General Quitman lay on the opposite side of the river above Fort Jackson.
The first intimation that the Confederate fleet had of an attack, was the sudden heavy and general bombardment about 3:30 a.m. between the forts and the attacking fleet. After 10 or 15 minutes the first vessel of the Federal fleet was discovered coming abreast of Fort Saint Philip and opening up on the fort with its bow guns, the rest of the fleet following.
The Louisiana brought its three bow guns, (one 7-inch rifled gun and two 9-inch guns) into action as well as its three broadside guns (one 32-pdr. rifled gun and two 8-inch guns), all that could be brought to bear. The vessel was moored on the river bank, so the port guns could not be used. The Louisiana fired only 12 shots.
The Manassas was abandoned and set on fire and drifted down the river in a sinking condition; the McRae was considerably cut up by grape and shot, after having been heroically fought. The Resolute, having run ashore a mile above the forts, ran up a white flag, but was prevented by the prompt action of the McRae from falling into the hands of the Federals. The Warrior was run ashore and burned on a point just above Fort Saint Philip. The Mosher, Music Belle, and Algerine in charge of fire barges were destroyed, as was also the Star.
The Stonewall Jackson, Governor Moore and the General Quitman were all destroyed.
The Defiance was the only Confederate vessel saved of the river fleet.
After this action the sea power of the Confederates at this point was practically wiped out. Eleven vessels were captured or burned...
Thirteen Federal vessels out of 17 got by the forts, these being the Hartford, Pensacola, Richmond, Brooklyn, Mississippi, Oneida, Iroquois, Cayuga, Wissahickon, Sciota, Kineo, Katahdin and Pinola. The Winona, Itasca, and Kennebec failed to get through. The Varuna was sunk.
The vessels which got by came to anchor at or below the quarantine station six miles above the forts, where they remained till about 10 a.m., when they passed up the river, with the exception of two that were left on guard at the station.
Shortly after the fleet got under way, a gunboat from below went up with a flag of truce and verbally demanded the surrender of the forts in the name of Commander Porter. This being refused, the bombardment was again commenced and lasted from about noon till sundown, some four hours, when it ceased altogether. The entire mortar fleet and accompanying vessels, except six gunboats, then got underway and passed down the river. During the night everything was quiet.
On April 25th there was no attack on the forts below, vessels of Porter’s fleet remaining in observation, and the day being spent in the forts repairing damages, shifting guns about, and making preparations to be ready when the attack should be renewed.
Farragut’s fleet continued up the river and engaged the Chalmette and McGhee batteries, which action was soon over, the last of the Confederate batteries being passed about 11 a.m. At 5 p.m. that day, General Lovell, the Confederate commander, gathering what supplies and men he could take with him, abandoned New Orleans, turning its affairs over to the civil authorities, whereupon the mayor of the city capitulated.
Marines were landed to preserve order, the city being in possession of a mob, and on May 1st General Butler arrived with 15,000 troops and took charge.
On April 26th the forts learned that New Orleans had surrendered, that troops were being moved up from Sable Island, and that men were being landed at the quarantine station above Fort Saint Philip with the evident intention of hemming in the works from above.
On the 27th a written demand was made that the forts surrender and it was refused.
The spirit of the Confederate troops up to this time and throughout the action and bombardment had been cheerful and courageous, but now a change came over them, rumors having reached them that the city above had surrendered. Everything remained quiet, however, until about midnight, when the garrison of Fort Jackson revolted in mass, seized the guard, and commenced to spike the guns, while many of the men (some 250) left the fort with all their arms.
These later surrendered to General Butler’s pickets. They stated that their officers intended to hold out as long as possible or while provisions lasted, and then blow up the forts; but that the city having surrendered and the Federals having gotten in their rear, they, the men, thought there was no further use of fighting.
Every endeavor was made to repress the revolt among the men remaining in Fort Jackson, but it was not successful; so there was no further use to think of fighting. Moreover, it was seen that no help could be expected from Fort Saint Philip, as it was itself threatened and likely to be attacked; so on the next morning, April 28th, although none of the men in Fort Saint Philip had revolted or deserted, yet, as a result of a conference between the two forts it was thought best to surrender on terms previously rejected.
The opening of the lower Mississippi was now an accomplished fact.
Casualties in the forts were: Fort Jackson, nine killed, 35 wounded. Fort Saint Philip, 2 killed, four wounded. Total, 11 killed, 39 wounded.
There are no reports of the battery commanders in the Records, so a detailed Confederate account cannot be obtained.
Injury to Fort Saint Philip by Federal fire was slight, as only one mortar was fired at it, it being far away from the mortar fleet. One 7-inch gun burst from the explosion of a shell in its bore near the muzzle; one 24-pdr. was broken in two by being struck by a solid shot; one 8-inch columbiad was temporarily dismounted; and several carriages were more or less damaged.
Because of the little damage done Fort Saint Philip, it was from its guns that the attacking fleet received most damage.
Fort Jackson was more severely handled. The mortar fleet, it is estimated, threw some 6000 or 7000 13-inch shells into the fort, expending in all, according to the report in the Century Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 16,800 shells, or 2800 shells per day for a period of a little over five days.
In detail, the damage at Fort Jackson consisted of: four bastion casemate guns disabled; 11 gun carriages struck; some 30 traverses injured; a large number of injuries on the western side of the outer curtain, where 20 out of 39 guns were more or less injured; ramparts of the fort severely damaged on every side, particularly on the two northern sides; several of the entrances from the parade ground under the ramparts converted into masses of ruins, some of them being one-third choked with debris;
Casemates cracked from end to end, one of the bastion casemates having its roof broken through in three places and its walls badly cracked; entrances to the casemates nearly all damaged, roofs being cracked and masses of brick thrown down or loosened; all buildings destroyed by fire or shell; and the two western bastions and the citadel badly cracked in many places, 86 shot and splinters striking its faces.
In addition to the work being much injured, the levee about it was cut in over a 100 places, water entering the casemates.
The credit of reducing the forts was given by the men to the mortar fleet, for although the surrender did not immediately follow the bombardment, yet it is probable that the awful mortar bombardment did demoralize the garrison.
The actual loss of life was slight and one writer has calculated that there were 16 tons of metal thrown for each man killed or wounded. Up to the 22nd of April the entire Confederate garrison is reported to have consisted of some 1100 men, and up to that time four had been killed and 14 wounded. This small loss of life was perhaps due in part, at least, to the fact that the men could see the mortar shells coming and would take cover in time; then, too, the soil upon which the forts stood allowed the shells to sink, sometimes as much as 20 feet, before exploding.
General Butler states in his reports that the forts were substantially as defensible as before the bombardment, especially Fort Saint Philip, it being quite uninjured, fully provisioned, and well supplied with ammunition. But most of the damage had been repaired by that time by the Confederates.
The mortar fleet and its flotilla had one killed and 20 wounded.
Of Farragut’s fleet the Hartford was hit 32 times, about half in the rigging and half in the hull, and had three men killed and 10 wounded and three guns disabled. The Cayuga was struck 42 times and had six wounded.
The Brooklyn was under fire an hour and a half and suffered the greatest loss, having 10 killed and 26 wounded. This vessel was struck in all 39 times. The Richmond had two killed and four wounded, receiving six hits in the hull and many in the rigging. The Pensacola was under fire about two hours and had no killed nor wounded; she received nine hits in the hull.
The Mississippi received 10 hits, eight of which passed through the ship. The Oneida sustained no damage. The Varuna, rammed by the Stonewall Jackson and sunk, had three killed. The Katahdin received two hits only, which was attributed to the speed of her run-by and to the fact that the shots from the forts went over.
The Kineo had nine hits and one killed and eight wounded. The Wissahickon had two wounded, receiving five hits; this vessel was low in the water. The Sciota had two men wounded. The Iroquois had eight killed and 24 wounded, and was badly injured in the hull. The Pinola received 12 hits and had three killed and eight wounded.
The Itasca had three wounded, receiving 14 hits and being severely damaged; in a sinking condition she fell back to the mortar fleet. The Winona had three killed and five wounded; she was compelled to fall back to the mortar fleet. The Portsmouth had to fall back, as she could not get her guns to bear on the forts.
In general terms it may be stated that Farragut’s vessels were struck only 23 times in their hulls from shots from Fort Jackson, while they received their greatest damage from Fort Saint Philip, which illustrates the advantage derived from the mortar fleet’s keeping Fort Jackson engaged.
The entire Federal loss was 36 killed and 123 wounded; and the total Confederate loss is estimated as from 1000 to 1500, though the losses at the forts were only 11 killed and 39 wounded, as stated.
Fort Saint Philip is reported to have expended: 675 8-inch solid shot, 171 8-inch shell, 13 13-inch shell, 142 10-inch mortar shell, 120 shot, shell, and grape from the upper water-battery, 470 shot, shell, and grape from the lower water-battery.
From the Federal mortar division the usual rate of fire was at 10 minutes interval, sometimes 20 minutes; but on the 24th of April, the day of the passage of the forts, the Norfolk Packet is reported to have fired 28 shells at the rate of one every two minutes and 40 seconds — the greatest rapidity of fire attained.
The heaviest charge of powder used by the mortar division was 23 pounds, which was required to reach Fort Saint Philip at a range of 4710 yards against a fresh wind.
In the 1st Division of the Federal fleet four vessels fired a total of 1512 shells, using 30,994 pounds of powder.
In the 2nd Division some individual vessels expended more than 300 shells.